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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By

HAROLD

E.

HURST*

A great many constitutional law, and relatively few administrative law, decisions were handed down by the Colorado Supreme
Court in 1960. Only those decisions of major and current importance are discussed here.
I.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Sovereign Immunity of the State from Suit
That a person who deals with the state in a contractual or
quasi-contractual situation may recover against the state for damages resulting from breach of contract seems to be settled in Colorado.' The theory applied in actions in contract brought against the
state was, in Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture,2 that the state, in entering into a contractual relationship, impliedly waived its immunity from suit. However, in the Ace Flying
Serv. case, a concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Moore argues at
great length and in eloquently sweeping passages, that "Whatever
may have been the rule heretofore, I am of the firm opinion that
any citizen may resort to litigation to protect his life, liberty or
property even though his adversary be the sovereign state of Colorado. The constitution cannot be so nullified as to permit the state
to deprive a citizen of 'property' without due process of law."'3 Some
of the language in Mr. Justice Moore's concurring opinion is singularly reminiscent of language in the majority opinion of Boxberger.
It is important to note, in analyzing cases decided in 1960, that
Mr. Justice Moore held the opinion in Ace Flying Serv., Inc. that
sovereign immunity has never been a part of Colorado law and that
the Colorado constitution was so written that every person would
have his day in court "even though his adversary be the sovereign
state of Colorado." He arrived at that conclusion by employing the
following language:
It is a historical fact, that when the constitution of the
State of Colorado was adopted it was patterned largely
upon the constitution of the State of Illinois. The constitution of that state then, and even now, contains a provision
as follows:
"The state of Illinois shall never be made defendant in
any court of law or equity."
That a similar provision was not incorporated in the
Colorado Constitution, although present in the instrument
which unquestionably was used as a model, is persuasive
evidence that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was discarded by its framers ....4
Shortly after Ace Flying Serv., Inc., the court was called upon
*Professor Hurst is Acting Dean of the University of Denver College of Law.
1 Boxberger v. State Highway Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); see also Ace Flying
Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
2 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
3 Id. at 31, 314 P.2d at 284.
4 Id. at 33, 314 P.2d at 285.
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to decide whether the sovereign immunity of the state prevented
recovery in Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n 5 of the
breakage, which had been paid under protest to the state and which
was held, in an earlier decision, Centennial Turf Club v. Racing
Comm'n,6 to be the property of the racing organization. The question there was whether, under the parimutuel racing act, 7 the
breakage belonged to the state or to the track. The court found
nothing in the act which required the payment of the breakage to
the state, and consequently the license of Centennial Turf Club to
conduct parimutuel betting seems not to have been conditioned
upon payment of the breakage to the state.
Relying upon Centennial, the plaintiff in Brush Racing Ass'n
sought to recover payments of breakage which it had made in past
years to the state. Again it is important to note, in analyzing the
1960 decisions, that neither Centennial nor Brush Racing Ass'n can
be considered as cases based upon claims sounding in contract. But
in the latter case, judgment for the association was affirmed by the
court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Hall without dissents or nonparticipants which said:
Counsel for the State vigorously urge the doctrine that
Colorado cannot be sued in its sovereign capacity, that the
State enjoys sovereign immunity from suit, and cite numerous decisions of this Court so holding. The cases relied
upon are outmoded by more recent pronouncements of this
5 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
6 129 Colo. 529, 271 P.2d 1046 (1954).
7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 129-2-9 (1953).
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Court. In Colorado "sovereign immunity" may be a proper
subject for discussion by students of mythology but finds
no haven or refuge in this Court. Boxberger v. Highway
Dept., [citation] . . . squarely in point and is a complete

answer to the State's archaic contention.8
With that language, Pandora's box was opened, and small wonder. The sweep of the language adopted by a unanimous court in
Brush Racing Ass'n was so broad as to admit of no exceptions or
limitations. Sovereign immunity was dead. The natural and probable result was the filing of numerous actions against municipalities, counties and the state to recover damages for personal injuries
alleged to have been the result of tortious acts of governmental
servants.
Five such cases were decided by the Supreme Court in 1960,
and astonished counsel and disappointed litigants discovered that
a part, at least, of the doctrine of sovereign immunity had somehow
been resurrected.
The first of such cases, Denver v. Madison,9 reversed a judgment of the district court for the City and County of Denver in
favor of an infant who had been found by the district court to have
been seriously and permanently injured as a result of the negligence of employees of the local city hospital. The reversal was ordered by a majority of four of the seven justices, invoking the rule:
Very firmly settled in the law of this state is the rule
that a municipality is not liable for the acts of officers,
agents or employees, committed by them in the discharge
of functions or duties which are governmental in nature
and which are "exercised in virtue of certain attributes of
sovereignty delegated to it for the welfare and protection
of its inhabitants.' 10
Counsel for the p!aintiff had relied upon the earlier cases" in
which there was not a whisper of limitation in the eloquently eulogized demise of sovereign immunity. But, said the court: "The
rule announced in those cases has no application to actions ex delicto." The court added that Ace Flying Serv., Brush Racing Ass'n
and Stone v. Currigan12 were cases "in which the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit in actions sounding in contract was repudiated." By what strained construction Brush Racing Ass'n was
converted into an action "sounding in contract" we are not told.
In a second hotly contested case, Liber v. Flor,13 the Supreme
Court divided again in a four to three decision in affirming a judgment of the trial court dismissing an action against a county for
damages allegedly resulting from tortious acts of county employees.
The court, in affirming, stated its reason as follows:
This court has not heretofore held that the state is liable in damages for the negligence of its servants; nor has
it been held that other governmental corporate entities are
8 136 Colo. 279, 284. 316 P.2d 582, 585 (1957).
9 351 P.2d 826 (Colo. 1960).
10 Id. at 829.
11 Ace Flying Serv., Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957);
Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957); and Stone v.
Currigan, 138 Colo. 442, 334 P.2d 740 (1959).
12 Stone v. Currigan, 138 Colo. 442 ?34 P.2d 740 (1959).
13 353 P.2d 590 'Colo. 1960).
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liable for the tortious acts of their servants performing
duties in furtherance of a governmental function, as distinguished from a proprietary function. Numerous decisions
of this court
have established the rule of no liability in
4
such cases.'

An interesting feature of the case just discussed is one which
will no doubt lead all administrative officers of cities, counties,
school districts, the state, and many kinds of political subdivisions
to make themselves personally judgment proof as soon as possible
after election or appointment. It is the ruling in Liber v. Flor that
although the county could not be liable for the torts of its employees, the county Commissioners as individuals could, nevertheless, "be held liable in all respects as other tort-feasors."''5 In the
case under discussion, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the action against the county commissioners, named in
the complaint individually as defendants, and sent the case back
for trial upon the issue of negligence of the commissioners, as individuals, in the supervision of their employees.
In three other cases coming before the court in 1960,16 the question of the liability of the state or a county for torts of their agents
was decided adversely to the plaintiffs, all of whom appear to have
relied upon the sweeping, unrestrained, unlimited and unanimous
ruling in Brush Racing Ass'n. What appeared to be solid ground
upon which the doctrine of sovereign immunity was laid to rest
turned out to be the sinking sand of grandiose obiter dictum, trapping the plaintiffs and carrying down with them the price of costly
appellate proceedings.
B. Definiteness and Certainty of Statutes
Two cases in 1960 required decision regarding the constitutional
sufficiency of vague and indefinite satutory definitions of prohibited conduct.
The most important case, involving most of the major and
minor oil companies, was Flank Oil Co. v. Tennessee Gas Trans.
7
Co." The plaintiff sought injunctive relief from allegedly injurious
violations, by the defendants, of the Colorado Unfair Practices Act"M
which prohibits sales of merchandise at less than cost for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition. The act
defined what was meant by "cost" with considerable particularity.
The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the prohibited conduct was stated in terms so vague and indefinite that persons subject to it could not determine whether theirs was a lawful course
of conduct, and on its face irreconcilable with the due process requirements of article XIV of the United States Constitution. The
trial court dismissed, but was reversed in the Supreme Court. The
court felt that the statutory definition, which included specific
kinds of expenses that were to be considered in determining "cost,"
was not too indefinite on its face, and that evidence must be taken
before it could be determined that the complexity of the oil com14 Id. at 592.
15 Ibid.

16 Faber v. State, 353 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1960); Berger v. Dep't of Highways, 353 P.2d 612 (Colo.
1960); M. & M. Oil Transp. v. County Comm'rs, 353 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1960).
17 349 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1960).
18 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 55-2-1, -2 (1953).
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pany business and production practices made it impossible to apply
the statutory standards.
19
Another case, Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery, turned on the
same question-whether the statutory definition of prohibited conduct was adequate to meet the constitutional requirements of the
20
and the fourteenth
due process clause of the state constitution
21
amendment of the federal constitution. The statute required that
benefits "shall
funeral
prepaid
on
premiums
as
received
funds
all
be invested, until properly expendable, in securities . . . " and violations were punishable as crimes. The gist of the statutory requirement was to require trustees to hold the assets "until properly
expendable," but nowhere in the statute were "proper expendi2 2tures" defined or identified. Quoting from the leading case on the
subject, the court struck down the statute.
These two cases seem to be quite consistent and compatible.
And in their compatibility would seem to lie a lesson for legislative
draftsmen. In Flank Oil Co.,23 a statute which prohibited sale below "cost"-a term obviously open to questionable meanings-in19
20
21
22
23

356 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960).
Colo. Const. crt. II, 9 25.
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 72-17-1 to -7 (1953).
Conclly v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 355 (1926).
Supra note 17.
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cluded other provisions defining that term with particularity sufficient that the court thought it might, without guessing, determine
from the evidence whether a defendant was in compliance or violation. But in Memorial Trusts, Inc., the mandate that funds be
held "until properly expendable," unaided by any statutory language as to what were or were not "proper expenditures," necessarily required persons to guess whether their conduct complied
with, or violated, the legislative policy and consequently violated
the standards of definiteness and certainty required by the due
process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
C. More Merris Confusion
The wake of the Merris case2 4 grows wider, and with it the confusion of both court and counsel as to just what Merris stands for.
Primary responsibility for the confusion rests solidly with the court,
which at one time holds one way and subsequently another, without persuasive logic, that municipal ordinances can or cannot be
enforced.
A trio of cases decided in 1960 added to the growing list of
examples of municipal regulation either: (1) sustained as involving matters of local and municipal concern, on the one hand, or (2)
struck down as involving matters of state-wide concern. Retallack
v. Police Court of Colorado Springs2 5 held that reckless and careless driving belonged in the first category even though there exist2 7ed a state statute26 regulating the matter. Gazotti v. Denver
placed the regulation and punishment of larceny in the second category and struck down the Denver ordinance under which Gazotti
was convicted. Mr. Justice Hall, specially concurring in the latter
case, was led to announce his dissatisfaction with the apparent lack
of logic in the two decisions:
As I view the situation, it is impossible to reconcile
Retallack with the case at bar [Gazotti]-they are parallel
cases-all the arguments presented in Retallack can be
urged with equal force in this case-all the arguments advanced in this case apply with equal force to Retallack.
Any effort to distinguish the cases can lead only to
frustration, futility and failure....
Though the majority opinion serves the useful purpose
of giving to Gazotti his freedom . . . it is, as I view it,

will, I fear, serve only to create conwholly inadequate 2and
8
flict and confusion.

A third case2 9 held that school light legislation was a matter of
local and municipal concern.
Perhaps it is time for the court to re-examine its position and
to begin with fundamental constitutional principles. The legislative
power of the state is vested in the General Assembly,""t not in municipalities. Further, the power cannot be redelegated by the General Assembly to municipalities except in those instances in which
24 Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
25 351 P.2d 884 (Colo. 1960).
26 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4-31, -32 (1953).
27 352 P.2d 963 (Colo. 1960).
28 Id. at 965.
29 Pickett v. Boulder, 356 P.2d 489 (Colo. 1960).
30 Colo. Const. art. V, § 1.
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local option is proper. 31 Consequently, it becomes material in every
case to determine whether (1) the municipal power claimed is one
which can be given, under the constitution, and (2) whether it was
given by the legislature. The Home Rule Amendment 32 raises
slightly different but no more difficult questions.
It may be granted that application of such principles will still
leave a narrow band of indecision demarking state power from municipal power. But that approach would provide some consistent
basis for decision and afford a satisfactory degree of predictability
in most cases.

II.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Administrative law cases in the Supreme Court were surprisingly few in number in 1960, and none of the cases involved novel
or difficult questions.
Perhaps the principal factor contributing to the paucity of
cases in 1960 was the enactment of the Administrative Practices
Act. 33 At any rate, lawyers in Colorado have, for the first time, an
administrative procedure code which serves essentially the same
purpose, in practice before Colorado administrative agencies, that
the Rules of Civil Procedure serve in regulating step by step procedure in courts of record. Lawyers, armed with the new act, will
not only be better informed as to the rights of their clients, but
will also become instructors to administrative agencies in matters
of procedure.
The act was hammered out over a number of years by the Administrative Law Committee of The Colorado Bar Association under the successive chairmanships of Glenn Donaldson, Esq., and
Hubert D. Henry, Esq. It should be studied by all Colorado lawyers.
It will eliminate much of the arbitrariness formerly occurring in
administrative hearing procedure and it will forestall many needless appeals.
31 See opinion of the justices in In re Municipal Suffroge to Women, 160 Mass. 586, 36 N.E. 488
(1894); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889); 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 4.13 to
4.15 (3rd ed. 1949).
32 Colo. Const. art. XX.
33 Colo. Sess. Laws 1959, chs. 33-38.
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